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JUDICIAL ABSTENTION AND EXCLUSIVE FEDERAL
JURISDICTION:
A RECONCILIATION
Federal judicial abstention made its debut nearly forty years ago1
as a narrow exception to the "virtually unflagging obligation of the fed-
eral courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them." 2 The steady expan-
sion3 of this exception in the absence of express legislative sanction
implicates complex separation of powers issues when a federal court is
faced with a claim within its exclusive jurisdiction. This Note examines
the conflict between judicial abstention and congressional enactments of
exclusive federal jurisdiction and recommends judicial and legislative
remedies to obviate this clash.
I
JUDICIAL ABSTENTION
The term "abstention" is ambiguous. The uncertainty that attends
the concept has been generated by semantic as well as substantive con-
fusion. Although some commentators have attempted to codify or sys-
tematize the doctrine, 4 courts' reluctance to acknowledge explicitly the
gradual expansion of abstention has contributed significantly to the am-
1 See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Se also Thompson v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
2 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
See also Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (dictum).
3 See 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4241, at 443 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER]. See generalfy
Schoenfeld, American Fderalism and the Abstention Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 73 DICK. L. REV.
605 (1969). Several courts and commentators maintain that abstention has become so well
ensconced in modem federal practice as to render the absolutist theory of federal jurisdiction
obsolete. See, e.g., Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1975);
Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302 (2d Cir. 1949); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 218 (3d ed. 1976).
4 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVIsION OF JURISDICTION BE-
TWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 48-50 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ALI STUDY]; C.
WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 218-29; 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, "tpfra note 3, § 4241, at
448-49; Bezanson, Abstention: The Supreme Court and Allocation ofjudicial Power, 27 VAND. L.
REV. 1107, 1111-33 (1974); Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman
Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1147-87 (1974); Shapiro, Abstention and P'maq
JurrdMiction: Two Chips Of'the Same Block?-A Comparative Analsis, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 75,
76-78 (1974); Note, Abstention and Mandamur After Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 566, 567-68 (1979); Note, Abstention by Federal Courts in Suits Challenging State Adminis-
trative Decisions: The Scope ofthe Burford Doctrine, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 971, 971 n.1 (1979);
Note, Federal Court Stays AndDimissals In Deference To Parallel State Court Proceedings: The Impact
of Colorado River, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 641, 648-51 (1977); 49 Miss. L... 951, 953-58 (1978).
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biguity. The absence of a functional definition of abstention not only
prevents judicial formulation of operative standards but obscures the
constitutional implications of the practice as well. Therefore, in order to
address properly the constitutional issue of judicial abstention in cases of
exclusive federal jurisdiction, it is first necessary to articulate the doc-
trine of abstention as it manifests itself in the case law.
As defined in this Note, judicial abstention is a sweeping descrip-
tion of the judicially created practice whereby a federal court, despite
the plaintiffs proper invocation of federal jurisdiction, declines to pro-
ceed promptly with the action in light of a similar proceeding pending
or yet to be filed in another forum.5 The term often is confined to a
much narrower scope;6 this is due largely to the normative nature of
efforts to define the doctrine. This Note, however, is concerned less with
what abstention should be than with what abstention zr as reflected in
the cases. The breadth of the judicial practice thus necessitates an
equally broad definition.
Judicial abstention generally manifests itself in the five "postural
patterns" described below.7 Abstention is predicated in each situation
5 Although the alternative forum may be another federal court, see, e.g., Landis v.
North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), the discussion here is limited to federal abstention in
view of a pending or yet to be filed proceeding in state court.
6 There are five "postural patterns" of abstention. See notes 7-85 and accompanying
text in/ia. Each "postural pattern" is a distinguishable category of abstention, encompassing
the procedural aspects of the case as well as the court's reasoning. Most observers either
ignore one or more of the postural patterns of abstention, see notes 7-10 and accompanying
text in/a, or simply confine their descriptions of the doctrine to a subset of the postural pat-
terns. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-
17 (1976) ("abstention" confined to three categories: circumvention of premature constitu-
tional decisions, discouraging federal interference with important state policies, and refusal to
enjoin pending state proceeding brought by state officials in good faith); ALI STUDY, supra
note 4, at 48-51, 282-98 (commentary to § 1371) (abstention confined to the Pullman and
Burford postural patterns; see notes 11-30 and accompanying text in/ra); C. WRIGHT, sura
note 3, at 218 (abstention is invoked to (1) avoid federal constitutional decision where poten-
tially dispositive state law question presented; (2) avoid needless conflict with state adminis-
tration of state affairs; (3) allow state courts to resolve unsettled questions of state law; (4) ease
federal court congestion); Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 590
(1977) (abstention confined to cases involving circumvention of premature constitutional de-
cision; see general'y notes 11-20 and accompanying text in/a). This apparent confusion, or
disagreement, may underlie courts' reluctance to acknowledge the scope of judicial
abstention.
7 See note 6 sura for an explanation of "postural patterns." Although courts and com-
mentators have expended much energy in their attempts to articulate and control the param-
eters of judicial abstention, they have virtually ignored the procedural methods by which
abstention can be exercised. A familiarity with the procedural complexities is essential, how-
ever, to a thorough understanding of the doctrine itself. Although the procedural method
employed in any particular case does not necessarily parallel the postural pattern of absten-
tion presented, courts often tailor the procedural devices to conform to the particular postural
pattern of abstention exercised. A federal judge can "abstain" in a given case by employing
any one of three procedural devices. Remittal is used to direct the parties to file and litigate an
action in another forum (usually state court) in lieu of the federal proceeding. For examples
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on different policy grounds. The underlying justification for abstention
in each particular case thus becomes the key to formulating a workable
definition of the doctrine as well as reasonable standards for its exercise.
Abstention has continued to thrive because it is supported, alternatively,
by the two transcendent policies of federalism and pragmatism. The
"conventional prototypes," 8 the bedrock of judicial abstention, emerged
from general principles of federalism; the concern for federal/state com-
ity outweighs any interests favoring adjudication of the dispute in plain-
tiff's chosen federal forum. Aside from the conventional prototypes,
however, the case law indicates that there are two other postural pat-
terns of abstention: jurisdictional "abeyance" and the total relinquish-
ment of federal jurisdiction as "wise judicial administration."9 These
two patterns are justified instead by considerations of pragmatism; the
presence of concurrent state court proceedings in such situations impli-
cates the extra expense and misappropriation of judicial resources inher-
ent in duplicative litigation.' 0
of what is here denominated "remittal," see Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498
(1972); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312
U.S. 496 (1941). The federal court will formally retain jurisdiction of the cause in order to
ensure the availability of an alternative forum in case the state court fails to adequately dis-
pose of the controversy. See, e.g., Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 513
(1972); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167,
179 (1959); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1941); Druker v. Sulli-
van, 458 F.2d 1272, 1277 (1st Cir. 1972).
A federal court generally will order dismissal when another tribunal can adjudicate more
effectively the entire controversy in proceedings already pending in that forum; nevertheless,
courts can also employ dismissal in the absence of pending proceedings. Dismissal is the least
common procedural method of abstention because it involves complete renunciation of fed-
eral jurisdiction. The court categorically refuses to exercise its jurisdiction and effectively
bars access to the federal forum. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
A federal court, however, normally will stay or suspend rather than dismiss the federal
action when related proceedings are pending in state court. Technically, the stay is only a
temporary suspension of federal jurisdiction, whereas the dismissal totally relinquishes federal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552 (7th Cir. 1975)
(district court's stay order vacated); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674
(5th Cir. 1973).
8 See notes 11-43 and accompanying text infia.
9 See notes 44-85 and accompanying text incfa.
10 Generally, commentators fail to recognize judicial abeyance as a form of abstention.
See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 4, at 1111-33; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 76-77; Note, supra note 4,
46 U. CHI. L. REv. at 971 n.l; Note, supra note 4, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. at 648-51; 55 NOTRE
DAME LAw. 601, 605 (1980). Those who subsume either jurisdictional abeyance or jurisdic-
tional relinquishment as "wise judicial administration," or both, under the abstention doc-
trine do so begrudgingly or cursorily, see, e.g., C: WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 227-29; Ashman,
Alfini & Shapiro, Federal Abstention: New Perspectives on its Current Vitality, 46 Miss. L.J. 629,
631-32, 652 (1975); McMillan, Abstention--TheJudicia qr Self-Inflicted Wound, 56 N.C. L. REV.
527, 527 n.2 (1978), and generally characterize these postural patterns as unwarranted pallia-
tion of crowded federal dockets. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 3, at 227-29; Ashman, Alfini
& Shapiro, supra, at 630. Relieving crowded federal dockets, however, is only one aspect of




1. Circumvention of Premature Constitutional Decisions
In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. ,II the Supreme Court formally
recognized judicial abstention as a means of avoiding premature consti-
tutional litigation. The Texas Railroad Commission had issued an or-
der prohibiting railroads from operating sleeping cars not supervised by
Pullman conductors. Pullman conductors were white, and porters were
black. Thus, the Commission's order effectively prevented blacks from
operating these cars. The Pullman Company, other railroads, and Pull-
man porters brought an action in federal court, contending that the
Commission's order was unauthorized by Texas law as well as violative
of the fourteenth amendment and commerce clause of the United States
Constitution. The Supreme Court determined that a question of state
law existed concerning the propriety of the Commission's assumption of
authority.1 2 If the Commission lacked such authority, the order would
have been beyond its jurisdiction and thus invalid under state law, ren-
dering the federal constitutional issue moot. Consequently, the Court
remitted 13 the parties to state court to obtain a ruling on the state law
issue. 14
Pullman's notion that a federal court should postpone15 exercising
jurisdiction when determination of an unsettled issue of state law by a
state court might avoid or modify a federal constitutional question en-
dures16 despite judicial and academic criticism. 17 This postural pattern
general considerations of pragmatism are properly part and parcel of judicial abstention as
exercised today and are substantiated not merely by "crowded federal dockets" but by
broader considerations as well. Duplicative litigation implicates the state court system and
the parties involved as well as the interests of the federal court. Abstention in such circum-
stances may be predicated on preserving the litigants' limited time and resources and the
efficiency of the respective court systems. See general'y notes 48-54 and accompanying text
infa.
11 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
12 Id. at 501.
13 See note 7 supra (definition of remittal).
14 312 U.S. at 501-02.
15 Although the federal court retains jurisdiction during the course of the state action,
return to federal court is not certain. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examin-
ers, 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964), for example, the Court held that
if a party freely and without reservation submits his federal claims for deci-
sion by the state courts, litigates them there, and has them decided there,
then-whether or not he seeks direct review of the state decision in [the
United States Supreme Court]--he has elected to forgo his right to return to
the District Court.
In other words, to preserve his right to return to federal court, a litigant must clearly indicate
that he is entering state court for adjudication of the state law issue in light of the constitu-
tional claim, rather than for adjudication of the federal constitutional claim itself. Id. at 419-
22. See also Government & Civic Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364,
366 (1957).
16 See Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972); Fornaris v. Ridge Tool
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of abstention not only serves the policies of federalism by deferring to
state courts on uncertain matters of local law, but also precludes a fed-
eral constitutional decision that a proper interpretation of local law
would render unnecessary. Nevertheless, neither an opportunity to
avoid a constitutional claim nor the doubtful nature of state law alone
justifies abstention. 18 Remittal is not automatic' 9 and is available only
when the state law issue is uncertain and subject to an interpretation
that will eliminate or significantly change the posture of the federal con-
stitutional question.
20
2. Discouraging Federal Interference with Important State Policies
The second conventional prototype of judicial abstention, also
founded upon considerations of federalism, 21 arises from the reluctance
of federal courts to intrude in matters of state domestic policy. In Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co. ,22 the Supreme Court upheld the district court's dis-
Co., 400 U.S. 41 (1970) (per curiam); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); cf. Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (abstention appro-
priate where state court interpretation of relevant state law might moot or change the federal
constitutional issue); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 815, 825-
26 (1959) (trial judge should stay action if federal constitutional issue is "intermingled with
unsettled questions of state law"). See generaly 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3,
§§ 4242-4243, at 449-82.
17 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 432-37
(1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 180 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272, 1274 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1972); ALI STUDY, supra
note 4, at 283-84 (commentary to § 1371); P. BATOR, .?. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHS-
LER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 994 (2d ed.
1973 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Field, supra note 6, at 591-92;
Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalirm: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24
F.R.D. 481, 488-89 (1959); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankf rters Doctrine In An
Activist Era, 80 HARv. L. REv. 604, 622 (1967). Professor Field suggests that the delay, ex-
pense, and frustration that litigants encounter under the Pullman pattern of abstention are
unjustifiable and recommends that Pullman be displaced by a certification procedure. Field,
supra, at 592, 605-09; see Kurland, supra, at 489-90. See generally Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416
U.S. 386 (1974); 17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4248, at 519-32 (discussing
certification to state court), 525 n.29 (citing state certification statutes).
18 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 815 n.21
(1976); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320
U.S. 228, 236-37 (1943); Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272, 1274 (1st Cir. 1972).
19 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959)
(per curiam).
20 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 251 n.14 (1967); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S.
528, 534-35 (1965).
21 See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) ("The
justification for [abstention under these circumstances] lies in regard for the respective compe-
tence of the state and federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-
state relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State.'). See general' Note, Absten-
tion: An E&ercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 226 (1959).
22 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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missal23 of an action concerning a drilling permit issued by a state
regulatory commission. 24 The state legislature had established a special
system of state court review of the commission's orders. The Supreme
Court concluded, therefore, that the exercise of federal jurisdiction effec-
tively would usurp the state's power of administrative review and regu-
lation of the local oil industry and deemed dismissal of the federal
actions appropriate under the circumstances.
25
Cases within the Burford pattern of abstention generally involve ar-
eas of traditional state power26 where the exercise of federal jurisdiction
would generate needless friction with a state's administration of its own
affairs. 27 As with the Pullman doctrine,28 however, abstention under the
Burford pattern should not be automatic. 29 Abstention is warranted
only if the state policy is of "substantial public import" 30 to the state, or
of such uncertain nature that federal disposition of the issue would dis-
rupt state efforts to establish a clear policy in the area of dispute.
3. Refusal to Enjoin Pending State Proceedings
The third conventional prototype of judicial abstention also rests
on principles of federalism and reflects the federal policy that generally
forbids enjoinder of pending state court proceedings. In Younger v. Har-
reis,31 the Supreme Court held that a federal court, in the absence of
exceptional justifications, should refuse to enjoin a pending state crimi-
nal proceeding prosecuted by state officials in good faith. Harris, in-
dicted in state court for violating the California Criminal Syndicalism
Act,3 2 filed suit in federal court for an injunction restraining the District
23 Se note 7 supra (definition of dismissal).
24 319 U.S. at 334.
25 Id. at 327-34.
26 See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam)
(water rights); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (emi-
nent domain); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (intrastate
railroad regulation); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979) (automobile
insurance rates).
27 See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814-15
(1976); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sabbagh, 603 F.2d 228 (1st Cir. 1979); C. WRIGHT, Supra note 3, at
222.
28 See notes 11-20 and accompanying text supra.
29 See County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959) ("Abdi-
cation of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under [abstention] only in the excep-
tional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court wouldcleary serve
an important countervailing interest." (emphasis added)). See also Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 816 (1976).
30 Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976);
cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 379-80 n.5 (1978) ("IThere is, of course, no doctrine
requiring abstention merely because resolution of a federal question may result in the over-
turning of a state policy.").
31 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
32 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400, 11401 (West 1970) (amended 1976).
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Attorney from prosecuting him, alleging that the state statute violated
his right of free expression under the first and fourteenth amendments of
the United States Constitution.33 A three-judge district court concluded
that the state statute was unconstitutional and issued an injunction re-
straining further state prosecution.34 The Supreme Court reversed the
district court's ruling on the grounds that it contravened the longstand-
ing policy against federal court interference with state court proceed-
ings.35 The Court explained that a court of equity should not restrain a
criminal prosecution when the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law
unless the plaintiff would suffer "irreparable injury"3 6 absent such relief.
Moreover, the Court declared, the policy against such interference is
augmented by underlying principles of comity and federalism.37 Al-
though federal courts should not hesitate to vindicate federal rights,
they should do so in ways that will not interfere with legitimate state
activities.
3 8
Although Younger and its companion cases39 "left open almost as
many questions as they resolved," 4 abstention usually will be exercised
33 Harris v. Younger, 281 F. Supp. 507, 509 (C.D. Cal. 1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
More specifically, Harris alleged that the pending prosecution and the prospective enforce-
ment of the state statute constituted a deprivation of his constitutional rights under color of
the statute, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 281 F. Supp. at 509.
34 Id. at 517.
35 401 U.S. at 41. The Court's disposition of the case did not necessitate consideration of
the applicability of the federal anti-injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1979), which pro-
vides that "[a] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." "Because our holding rests on the
absence of the factors necessary under equitable principles to justify federal intervention," the
Court stated, "we have no occasion to consider whether 28 U.S.C. § 2283. . .would in and
of itself be controlling under the circumstances of this case." 401 U.S. at 54. The Court
decided this question one year later in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), holding that
"§ 1983 is an Act of Congress that falls within the 'expressly authorized' exception of [the
anti-injunction statute]." Id. at 243.
36 401 U.S. at 46.
37 The concepts of federalism and comity are embodied in
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States




39 Byre v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Perez v.
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971).
40 17 WRIGr, MILLER & COOPER, suira note 3, § 4251, at 542-43 (footnote omitted).
For an excellent overview of Younger and its progeny, see id. §§ 4251-4255.
In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the Court held that federal declaratory
relief is not precluded, regardless of whether injunctive relief may be appropriate, when a
state prosecution under a disputed state criminal statute has been threatened but is not pend-
1981]
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under the third conventional prototype unless the federal plaintiff dem-
onstrates bad faith and harassment on the.part of state officials 41 or the
statute in question is flagrantly and patently unconstitutional on its
face.42 Moreover, abstention is not warranted in the absence of a pend-
ing prosecution43 because the relevant principles of comity, federalism,
and equity are not implicated.
B. Federal Abeyance in Light of Concurrent State Proceedings
In addition to the conventional prototypes and traditional descrip-
tions of abstention, 44 the cases clearly demonstrate that a fourth postural
pattern of abstention exists: the abeyance or suspension of a federal ac-
tion pending final determination of a concurrent proceeding between
the parties in state court. Abeyance is always effectuated by the stay45
and rests primarily on pragmatic considerations rather than on the deep-
rooted notions of federalism that underlie the conventional prototypes.
ing. Id. at 475. In its next Term, a closely divided Court in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975), held that "where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs
after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have
taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger o. Harris should apply in full force."
Id. at 349 (first emphasis added). Consequently, as one authority has noted,
the dividing line between Younger and Steffel continues to turn on the pen-
dency of a state proceeding, but the commencement of the federal action is no
longer the critical date in determining whether a state action is pending. In-
stead the federal court is to make that determination when it is ready to com-
mence proceedings of substance on the merits.
17 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4253, at 565.
Younger later was extended from the criminal to the civil context in Huffman v. Pursue,
Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Hujinan, state officials had obtained an injunction in state court
to close down Pursue's theatre under the Ohio public nuisance statute, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3767.01-.99 (Page 1980). Pursue did not appeal the state court decision, but im-
mediately filed an action in federal court challenging the statute. The district court perma-
nently enjoined execution of a portion of the state court judgment on constitutional grounds.
On appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the action so that the district court could consider
the case in light of the Younger decision. The Court reiterated the importance of federalism
considerations and explained that Pursue should have exhausted its state appellate remedies
before seeking federal relief. 420 U.S. at 609.
The Hufiman Court confined its holding to the type of civil action presented there ("a
state proceeding which in important respects is more akin to a criminal prosecution than are
most civil cases. . [T]he [state] proceeding is both in aid of and closely related to criminal
statutes. . . ." Id. at 604). Id. at 607. Subsequently, however, the Court extended Younger
to include other civil proceedings involving the state. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)
(temporary custody of abused children); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (writ of
attachment to protect fiscal integrity of public assistance programs); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977) (civil contempt).
41 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,54
(1971).
42 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,611 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,56
(1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
43 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 475 (1974); see note 40 supra.
44 See note 6 supra.
45 See note 7 supra (definition of stay).
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The judge stays the action, in other words, because he believes it is sensi-
ble to do so.
In PPG Industries, Inc. v. Continental Oil Co. ,46 for example, PPG filed
an action against Conoco in federal district court for a declaratory judg-
ment and injunctive relief. Previously, Conoco had filed a declaratory
judgment action in state court against PPG and another party; the state
action embraced the same issues as the federal suit. The district court
stayed the federal action, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, predicating its
decision on such considerations of practical prudence 47 as judicial econ-
omy and concern for the litigants' time and resources. 48
Various practical considerations support abeyance. In the absence
of abeyance, the waste of judicial resources is inevitable, because the
action concluded first will be given preclusive effect in the suit still in
progress.49 The inevitability that some facet of res judicata will arise,
either claim or issue preclusion, often provokes a race to the court-
house50 and may create needless friction between the state and federal
systems.51 Furthermore, duplicative proceedings invite undesirable pro-
cedural tactics and maneuvers,5 2 generate unnecessary expenditures,
and increase the caseload of already overburdened federal dockets.
53
A federal court should not, however, exercise its power of abeyance
in deference to concurrent state proceedings indiscriminately. It should
require the parties to litigate the issues in a forum capable of resolving
the major controversy.54 The federal forum may be the preferred choice
46 478 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973).
47 Id. at 680 ("[Ihe increasingly crowded dockets of the federal courts have magnified
the importance of thispractical coaideration." (emphasis added)). See also Thompson v. Boyle,
417 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); Amdur v. Lizars, 372 F.2d 103
(4th Cir. 1967); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1964); Mottolese v. Kauf-
man, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949); Butler v. Judge of United States Dist. Court, 116 F.2d 1013
(9th Cir. 1941); Note, Power to Stay Federal Proceedings Pending Termination of Concurrent State Liti-
gation, 59 YALE LJ. 978, 991 (1950).
48 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1973).
49 See Note, Stays of Federal Proceedings in Deference to Concurrently Pending State Court Suits, 60
COLUM. L. REv. 684, 685 (1960); Note, supra note 47, at 983.
50 See Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975); PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 680 (5th Cir. 1973); Note, supra note 49, 60
COLUM. L. REv. at 688; Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Prior State Court Findings in Cases
within Exclusive FederalJurisdiction, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1281 n.7 (1978).
51 See Note, supra note 49, 60 COLUM. L. REv. at 688; Note, supra note 4, 44 U. CM. L.
REv. at 641.
52 Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 194 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Note, supra note 47, at 983.
53 See Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817, 820 (9th Cir. 1975); Kurland,
supra note 17, at 492; Note, supra note 4, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. at 641.
54 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942); Movielab, Inc. v.
Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a'd per curam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1971); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61, 62 (D. Del. 1968).
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if the parties or issues differ significantly between the actions55 or if the
absence of certain procedural devices in the state court-for example,
liberal federal discovery-would affect significantly the outcome of the
litigation. 56 If the state court is otherwise competent to adjudicate the
issues, the federal parties are parties to the state proceeding (or could be
by joinder), and there is no critical procedural disparity involved, the
federal judge properly may stay the federal suit or certain issues therein
pending state court litigation.
5 7
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly recognized jurisdic-
tional abeyance as an expansion of conventional abstention, it recently
endorsed the procedural device that effectuates jurisdictional abey-
ance.5 8 In Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. ,59 the Court acknowledged the
discretionary power of a district court to stay federal proceedings in def-
erence to a related contemporaneous state action.60 The suit initially
arose in state court because Calvert had attempted to rescind an agree-
ment to join a reinsurance pool operated by American Mutual Reinsur-
ance Company. American Mutual sued in Illinois state court, seeking to
bind Calvert to the reinsurance pool agreement. Calvert filed a federal
complaint, which included allegations of federal securities violations,
against American Mutual on the same day that it answered and filed a
counterclaim to American Mutual's state court complaint. 6' Judge Will
of the district court subsequently stayed federal proceedings pending the
55 See Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629 (2d Cir. 1976); Lecor, Inc. v. United
States Dist. Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974); Cunningham v. Ford Motor Co., 413 F.
Supp. 1101, 1106 (D.S.C. 1976); Abdin v. Goodbody & Co., 339 F. Supp. 1311, 1313 (E.D.
Wis. 1972).
56 See Note, supra note 49, 60 COLJM. L. REv. at 705-06; Note, supra note 47, at 984.
57 See, e.g., Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949), in which the Second
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to stay a federal shareholders' derivative suit
pending determination of a similar state court action. See also Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of
America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942); Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir.
1975); Thompson v. Boyle, 417 F.2d 1041, 1042 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[T]he ends of sound admin-
istration ofjustice are more likely to be served than obviated" by abeyance in certain circum-
stances.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 972 (1970); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Adkins, 330 F.2d 595 (9th Cir.
1964). But see Wright, supra note 16, at 826.
58 See note 45 and accompanying text supra. In Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S.
655 (1978) (plurality opinion), the Court sanctioned the discretionary stay order, see note 60
in/a, but did not explicitly recognize the propriety of abeyance as an exercise of judicial
abstention. In fact, the plurality never mentioned abstention. The decision is thus indicative
of courts' reluctance to acknowledge the actual scope of abstention as well as the nebulousness
of the doctrine as traditionally defined.
59 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (plurality opinion).
60 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the plurality, explained that "a district court's decision
to defer proceedings because of concurrent state litigation is generally committed to the dis-
cretion of that court." Id. at 665.
61 Calvert's answer and state court counterclaim essentially alleged common law fraud
and securities law violations. The federal suit also involved securities law violations as well as
other allegations asserted in the state court defense. Id. at 658-59. Among the securities
violations alleged was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 27 of that
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outcome of the state suit against Calvert. 62 The Seventh Circuit re-
sponded with a writ of mandamus directing Judge Will to vacate the
stay and proceed with the federal securities claims. 63 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari, 4 but only to consider the propriety of the use
of mandamus in the case,65 and later reversed in a five to four plurality
decision.
66
Speaking for the plurality, Justice Rehnquist noted that congres-
sional expansion of federal jurisdiction has led to increasing overlap be-
tween state and federal claims; thus, federal courts may properly defer
to state courts in certain situations to avoid federal/state judicial friction
and duplicative litigation.67 Because of the context in which the Court
considered the controversy, however, the plurality was generally silent
with respect to guidelines for the exercise of such discretion.68 More
notably, although the case involved an exclusively federal claim, the
plurality abnegated the opportunity to discuss the effect of exclusive ju-
risdiction upon this growing area of judicial abstention.
69
C. Rinz'quishment of FederalJurisdiction as "Wise Judicial Administration"
Although courts generally have failed to acknowledge the breadth
of abstention practice, the Supreme Court has attempted to enunciate
the parameters of judicial abstention. In Colorado River Water Conservation
District v. United States,70 the United States filed suit in federal court to
obtain adjudication of the government's rights to certain state waters. A
Colorado statute divided the state into seven judicial "water divisions"
in order to effectuate the prompt and comprehensive disposition of such
claims. 71 When the United States filed the Colorado River action, it was
act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976), grants federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the
Act.
62 See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 560 F.2d 792, 794 (7th Cir. 1977), reo'd, 437 U.S. 655
(1978) (plurality opinion).
63 560 F.2d at 797.
64 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 434 U.S. 1008 (1978).
65 437 U.S. at 658.
66 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
67 Id. at 663.
68 The Court was concerned with the Seventh Circuit's issuance of a writ of mandamus
to vacate Judge Will's stay order. See generaly Note, sufira note 4, 64 CORNELL L. REv. Jus-
tice Rehnquist concluded that a writ of mandamus would be authorized only if Calvert could
show a "'clear and indisputable' right" to have its claims adjudicated in federal court. 437
U.S. at 662. The stay order was a discretionary decision; a "clear and indisputable" right
could not conceivably coexist with such discretionary power. Therefore, the writ could not
issue.
69 See general'y note 61 sufra; notes 93-122 and accompanying text infra. For further
analysis of Will as it relates to exclusive federal jurisdiction, see notes 111-14 and accompany-
ing text infra.
70 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
71 CoLn. REv. STAT. § 37-92-101 (1973).
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concurrently involved in water rights litigation in several such state divi-
sions.72 After the federal suit was initiated, a party to a related state
proceeding joined the United States to the state action under the Mc-
Carran Amendment. 73 The district court subsequently dismissed 74 the
federal action in light of the state proceeding already in progress and to
which the United States had just been made a party. The court of ap-
peals reversed the order as an inappropriate exercise of judicial absten-
tion,75 but the Supreme Court held that the district court's decision to
dismiss was proper.76 The Court recognized that "there are principles
unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and re-
gard for federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the
contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions. ... These prin-
ciples rest on considerations of '[w]ise judicial administration, giving re-
gard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition
of litigation.' ,,77
Although the Court explicitly refused to recognize the dismissal as
abstention, 78 its decision evinces another postural pattern of judicial ab-
stention unlike the conventional prototypes. The Court emphasized the
federal courts' obligation to exercise their jurisdiction 79 and explained
that the circumstances permitting dismissal of a federal action for rea-
sons of "wise judicial administration" are even "more limited" than
72 424 U.S. at 806.
73 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976). The McCarran Amendment provides for joinder of the
United States as defendant in suits for the adjudication of water rights:
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by
appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and
the United States is a necessary party to such suit.
Id.
74 See note 7 supra (definition of dismissal).
75 United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
76 424 U.S. at 820.
77 Id. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952)).
78 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, explicitly maintained that the propriety of
dismissal under such circumstances cannot be justified under the abstention doctrine "in any
of its forms." 424 U.S. at 813. Justice Brennan confined his definition of "the doctrine of
abstention" to the conventional prototypes. Id. at 814-17. See generally notes 11-43 and ac-
companying text supra. Thus, the majority's characterization of Colorado River is predictable.
The Court preferred to confine the term "abstention" to the limited set of particular examples
(the conventional prototypes) that rest on grounds of federalism rather than using the term to
convey a more comprehensive description of the general judicial practice itself, which rests on
grounds of both federalism and pragmatism. See generally notes 5-10 and accompanying text
supra.
79 424 U.S. at 817.
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those appropriate for judicial abstention in its traditional forms.80 A
federal court presented with a claim related to concurrent state proceed-
ings may, therefore, dismiss the federal action only if special circum-
stances' override the heavy obligation to exercise jurisdiction.
Colorado River thus establishes a fifth postural pattern of judicial ab-
stention under which a federal court may, when presented with a federal
claim, totally relinquish its jurisdiction in deference to a pending state
action in order to avoid duplication of judicial effort and ensure that the
controversy is adjudicated in the forum most likely to make a compre-
hensive decision.8 2 Although its theoretical basis is the pragmatism of
"wise judicial administration," Colorado River is a hybrid of the Burford
prototype8 3 and jurisdictional abeyance. 84 Although jurisdictional
abeyance is based on pragmatic considerations, it does not involve dis-
missal.8 5 On the other hand, the Burford prototype frequently does in-
volve dismissal-but its underlying justification is federalism, not
pragmatism. This may explain the Colorado River Court's limited en-
dorsement of pragmatic dismissal to situations more restricted in scope




Certain areas of statutory law are accompanied by a legislative pol-
icy judgment that affirmative claims for relief arising from such statu-
80 Id. at 818.
81 The Court found such special circumstances in Colorado River. First, the policy behind
the McCarran Amendment is to avoid piecemeal litigation of water rights in the river system.
In addition, the federal action was relatively incipient, the state proceedings were of an exten-
sive nature, and the government was participating in other such state actions. See id. at 819-
20.
82 The Seventh Circuit recently reaffirmed Colorado River in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v.
American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1233 (7th Cir. 1979).
83 See generaly notes 21-30 and accompanying text supra.
84 See genfral4' notes 44-69 and accompanying text supra.
85 Although it has been argued that a stay is, in effect, a dismissal because of the possible
preclusive effects of the state decision, see PPG Indus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d
674, 682 (5th Cir. 1973); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 1963); 17
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4247, at 517-18; Note, supra note 4, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. at 662 n.143; 55 NoTRE DAME LAw. 601, 606 n.35 (1980), the procedural distinction
between the two is clear. The dismissal is a complete renunciation of federal jurisdiction, but
a stay ensures formal retention of federal jurisdiction so that the federal court can monitor
subsequent developments and reserve the right to make the ultimate decision. See PPG In-
dus., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 478 F.2d 674, 682 (5th Cir. 1973); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v.
Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 835 (9th Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion); Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Ameri-
can Mut. Reinsurance Co., 459 F. Supp. 859, 863-64 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (mem.), afd, 600 F.2d
1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
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tory rights are to be brought exclusively in the federal courts.8 6
Although a state court may consider an exclusively federal matter if it is
raised collaterally in a state proceeding,87 exclusive federal jurisdiction
generally is indicative of a congressional determination that the pro-
tected interests extend beyond the individual parties to the suit.8 8 The
grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction may be an attempt to ensure uni-
form vindication of federal laws89 or the availability of federal procedu-
ral rules,9° to develop and maintain federal expertise in such areas,91 or
to eschew state court incompetence or prejudice 92 with respect to con-
troversies under such statutes. The type ofjurisdiction (exclusive or con-
current) that Congress selects for a particular area may betoken the
weight it accords these interests. If so, judicial abstention in the face of
an exclusive jurisdictional grant is a serious challenge to Congress's pre-
86 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1981) (antitrust) (implied exclusive jurisdic-
tion); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976) (securities); '18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1976) (crimes against the United
States); 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1976) (admiralty); 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1976) (bankruptcy); 28
U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West Supp. 1981) (antitrust) (implied exclusive jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338 (1976) (patents and copyrights); 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (Supp. III 1979) (actions against
mission members, consuls, or vice consuls of foreign states).
The jurisdictional grant covering private actions under both the Sherman and Clayton
antitrust acts provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent .... "
15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). Courts, however, have determined
that such jurisdiction is exclusively federal. E.g., Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448,
451 n.6 (1943); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency v. Curtis Publishing Co., 252 U.S. 436,
440 (1920) (dictum); Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 924, 935 (D. Del.
1962), rev'don other grounds, 323 F.2d 787 (3d Cir. 1963); see Redish & Meunch, Adjudication of
Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 316-18 (1976) (arguing that legis-
lative history of Sherman Act indicates that Congress did not intend exclusive federal juris-
diction); Note, ExclusiveJurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Pi'vate CivilActions, 70 HARV. L. REV.
509, 510 & n.13 (1957) (same).
87 See McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975). See
generally Note, supra note 86, at 510.
88 Congress's power to grant exclusive federal jurisdiction was declared constitutional in
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429-30 (1866). For discussions and critiques of
exclusive jurisdiction, see Currie, ResJudicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 317,
347-48 (1978); Note, supra note 86.
89 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Cooper, State Law ofPatent Exploitation, 56 MINN. L. REV. 313, 315 (1972); Note, supra note 4,
64 CORNELL L. REV. at 590; Note, supra note 50, 91 HARv. L. REV. at 1281-82; Note, supra
note 86, at 511; Note, ResJudicata" Exclusive FederalJurisdiction and the Eect of Prior State-Court
Detenninations, 53 VA. L. REV. 1360, 1365 (1967).
90 Note, supra note 4, 64 CORNELL L. REV. at 590; Note, supra note 50, 91 HARV. L.
REV. at 1282; Note, supra note 89, 53 VA. L. REV. at 1365.
91 Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 670 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Cooper, supra note 89, at 315; Note, sura note 4, 64 CORNELL L. REV. at 590; Note, supra
note 50, 91 HARV. L. REV. at 1282; Note, sura note 86, at 512; Note, supra note 89, 53 VA. L.
REV. at 1365.
92 Note, supra note 4, 64 CORNELL L. REV. at 590; Note, supra note 50, 91 HARv. L.
REV. at 1282; Note, supra note 86, at 512.
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viously uncontroverted prerogative to allocate jurisdiction in the lower
federal courts.
A. Effects onJudicial Abstention
1. Generaly
The power of a federal court to exercise judicial abstention when
the federal action involves a claim within the court's exclusive jurisdic-
tion is an open question.93 Some observers maintain that the exclusive
nature of federal jurisdiction totally disengages the power of judicial ab-
stention regardless of the complexity or peculiarity of the particular
facts in any given situation.9 4 Some courts have refused to stay federal
proceedings in deference to legislative jurisdictional policy 95 or simply
because the state court would be unable to grant affirmative relief on an
exclusively federal matter.
96
In Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Ziroli,97 Ampex Corporation sued Mach-
Tronics in state court, alleging unfair competition, breach of confidenti-
ality, and wrongful appropriation of trade secrets. As an affirmative de-
fense, Mach-Tronics asserted that Ampex had violated federal antitrust
laws.98 Two months later, Mach-Tronics sued Ampex in federal district
court alleging federal antitrust violations. The district court stayed the
federal claim pending the outcome of the state action. The Ninth Cir-
cuit ordered the district court to vacate its stay, stating that judicial
abstention would "fly in the face" 99 of congressional jurisdictional
policy. 00
Other courts that have refused to exercise judicial abstention in
93 Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1060 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 682 (1981)
(Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
94 See, e.g., Wellington Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 27-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 601, 613 (1980); 24 VILL. L. REv. 815, 825 (1978-
1979).
95 E.g., Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 834 (9th Cir. 1963); Lyons v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 222 F.2d 184, 189 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955); Wellington
Computer Graphics, Inc. v. Modell, 315 F. Supp. 24, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
96 E.g., McGough v. First Arlington Nat'l Bank, 519 F.2d 552, 555 (7th Cir. 1975);
Lecor, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974); Movielab, Inc. v.
Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afdper curnam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1971); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72,
74 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
As defined in this Note, an "exclusively federal" matter is an issue that, if made the basis
of a claim for affirmative relief under a statute granting exclusive jurisdiction to the federal
courts, would be within the federal courts' exclusive jurisdiction.
97 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
98 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West Supp. 1981) grants implied exclusive federal jurisdiction for
controversies arising under the antitrust provisions. See note 86 supra.
99 316 F.2d at 833.
100 The court found support for such reasoning in Lyons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955), an earlier decision involving similar
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matters involving grants of exclusive jurisdiction have taken a less rever-
ential and more expedient approach to the problem. These courts sim-
ply regard the exclusive grant as an additional factor to be considered
when the district court decides, in its discretion, whether or not to stay
the federal suit. 1° 1 The presence of an exclusively federal claim may be
a determinative factor, however, if it appears that the presence of such a
claim would severely hamper the state court's ability to adjudicate the
controversy. 102
Nevertheless, exclusive jurisdiction has not entirely stolen the thun-
der from judicial abstention. In Klein v. Walston & Co. ,103 the Second
Circuit held that although the state court would be powerless to deter-
mine certain claims asserted in the federal action but not advanced in
the state suit, the state court could "authoritatively determine the com-
mon law claims and perhaps also defenses. . that may be dispositive
of [the exclusively federal claim] as well."' 1 4 Thus, the district court was
correct in staying the federal action pending final determination of the
state suit. Furthermore, "in these days of congested calendars the judge
was amply justified in not allowing litigation. . . to occupy the energies
facts, in which Judge Learned Hand had formulated the problem as one of congressional
intent:
[T~he inquiry comes down to whether, when Congress gave exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the district court . . ., it only meant that the "person who shall be
injured" must sue in the district court to recover damages; or whether it also
meant that the district court must have unfettered power to decide the claim
Id. at 188. Judge Hand chose the latter interpretation and directed the lower court to vacate
the stay and proceed with the litigation. Id. at 189-90.
The Ninth Circuit was equally concerned about the absence of a jury in the state action:
It would seem to us to be unthinkable that a federal court having exclusive
jurisdiction of a treble damage antitrust suit would tie its own hands by a stay
of this kind in order to permit a judge of a state court, without a jury, to make
a determination which would rob the federal court of full power to determine
all of the fact issues before it.
316 F.2d at 833.
101 See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra Seegeneral notes 44-69 and accompa-
nying text supra.
102 See Cotler v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, 526 F.2d 537,542 (3d Cir. 1975) (secur-
ities-neither federal, state, nor parties' interests would be served by judicial abstention);
Lecor, Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 502 F.2d 104, 106 (9th Cir. 1974) (securities-federal
court only forum where all issues with respect to all parties can be litigated); Movielab, Inc. v.
Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806, 811 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aj'd per cun'am, 452 F.2d 662 (2d
Cir. 1971) (securities-all claims could be more effectively adjudicated in federal court); Note,
supra note 4, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. at 677-78 (categorical assumption that state forum is more
appropriate may be rebutted in certain cases by presence of exclusive federal jurisdiction). See
aso Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 285 F. Supp. 61 (D. Del. 1968) (mem.) (securities); Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Cove Vitamin & Pharmaceutical, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)
(copyright).
103 432 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
104 Id. at 937.
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of two courts at the same time. 10 5 In Weber v. Consumers Digest, Inc. ,106
the Seventh Circuit held that the district judge should have stayed10 7 a
federal antitrust suit because the federal plaintiff had asserted a counter-
claim in the state dispute seeking the same recovery under state antitrust
laws. 108 In Weiner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 109 the plaintiff originally
had sued in state court alleging breach of contract; the defendant an-
swered and asserted a counterclaim in state court, in response to which
the plaintiff alleged securities violations as both an affirmative defense
and as grounds for a subsequent federal complaint. The Ninth Circuit
held that "even if the state court finds itself precluded from giving af-
firmative relief under the [federal securities law]..., a stay would not
necessarily be inappropriate."' 10
The closest the Supreme Court has come to settling this issue is its
decision in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co. lII Curiously, the Court ac-
knowledged the problem 1 2 but did not resolve it. 113 In a vehement dis-
sent, however, Justice Brennan introduced the problem of res judicata
with respect to state court decisions on matters within exclusive federal
105 Id See aso Shareholders Management Co. v. Gregory, 449 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam).
106 440 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1971).
107 The court concluded that dismissal was improper and that a stay was the appropriate
procedural device. See generally notes 7 & 85 supra.
108 440 F.2d at 732.
109 521 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1975).
11o Id. at 822.
111 437 U.S. 655 (1978). For a discussion of the facts of Will and the ramifications of the
decision on other aspects ofjudicial abstention, see notes 58-69 and accompanying text supra.
112 The plurality stated:
Calvert contends that a district court is without power to stay proceed-
ings, in deference to a contemporaneous state action, where the federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over the issue presented. Whether or not this is so,
[the district court] has not purported to stay consideration of Calvert's claim
for damages under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is the onl issue
which may not be concurrently resolved by both courts.
437 U.S. at 666 (first emphasis added).
113 Judge Will had formally stayed only the adjudication of the issues within the concur-
rent jurisdiction of the state and federal courts (all issues except for Calvert's securities claim);
however, decision on the securities claim was delayed for over two and one-half years while the
state action proceeded, and, at the time of the Supreme Court decision, the claim was still
dormant. Justice Rehnquist treated the delay as a routine consequence of a crowded federal
docket, 437 U.S. at 667, but Judge Will's subsequent decision after remand from the Seventh
Circuit is more enlightening. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co.,
459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978), aj'd, 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979). In view of Calvert's
never having contributed any funds to the pool, thereby eliminating any claim for damages,
Judge Will maintained that Calvert's federal securities claim was a "contrived" and "reactive
defensive maneuver" designed to vex the other party. Id. at 862, 863. Consequently, Judge
Will decided to continue to stay all aspects of the federal dispute in order to "assure efficient
justice to the litigants and to maintain the integrity of the two court systems." Id. at 862.
The Seventh Circuit later affirmed the stay in Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Rein-
surance Co., 600 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1979).
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jurisdiction:' 14 what effect should a federal court accord a state court
decision involving an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts?
2. Res Judicata
The preclusive effect of a state court decision on matters within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts is also an open question. 15 It
is difficult to strike the perfect balance between the growing importance
of finality and the interests that underlie grants of exclusive jurisdic-
tion.' 16 Several courts have implied that the latter interests are para-
mount by refusing to exercise judicial abstention' 7 in exclusive
jurisdiction cases because of the possible res judicata effect of the state
courtjudgment. InLyons v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. ,118 the Second Cir-
cuit vacated a stay order on grounds that the grant of exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the district courts "should be taken to imply an immunity of
their decisions from any prejudgment elsewhere . . . ." 119 Courts are,
however, less reluctant to give preclusive effect to factual determinations
114 See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674-76 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("I confess to serious doubt that it is ever appropriate to accord res judicata effect to a state-
court determination of a claim over which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
1.. " Id. at 674.).
"5 Id. at 674 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Key v. Wise, 629 F.2d 1049, 1062 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 682 (1981) (Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); 17
WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 3, § 4247, at 69 (Supp. 1981); 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 601, 609 (1980). See generally Note, sura note 50, 91 HARV. L. REv.; Note, supra note
89, 53 VA. L. REV.
116 Seegenerally Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127 (1979); Currie, supra note 88, at 325; Vestal,
Predusion/Resjudicata Variables: Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEo. LJ. 857, 857-58 (1966); Developf-
ments in the Law-ResJudicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818 (1952); Note, supra note 50, 91 HARV. L.
REv. at 1281-82.
117 The res judicata problem is arguably irrelevant to the decision to exercise judicial
abstention if the court presupposes the unassailability of the congressional policy judgment.
If the court were to accord preclusive effect to the state court determination, for instance, such
an action would presumably undermine legislative intent and thus violate the courts' policy
of deference to Congress. On the other hand, if the court were to ignore the state proceedings,
there would be no reason to delay the federal action since it would eventually have to proceed
in full force. See Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 675-76 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 1963).
118 222 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955). See also Mach-Tronics, Inc. v.
Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 63 F.R.D.
39 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
afd per curam, 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971). But see Currie, sfupra note 88, at 348.
119 222 F.2d at 189. See also Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 674-75 (1978)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964) (England involved a nonexclusive federal constitutional claim. The Court explained
that "where, but for the application of the abstention doctrine, the primary fact determina-
tion would have been by the District Court, a litigant may not be unwillingly deprived of that
determination." Id. at 417); Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 491 (1949); Note, Exucluve Federal
Court Jurs'diction and State Judgment Finality-The Dilemma Facing the Federal Courts, 10 SETON
HALL L. REV. 848, 867 (1980).
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made in state proceedings. 20 In Brown v. Fesen, 21 for example, the
Supreme Court refused to apply res judicata in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing in light of the bankruptcy court's exclusive jurisdiction over the ac-
tion. The Court noted, however, that "[i]f, in the course of adjudicating
a state-law question, a state court should determine factual issues using
standards identical to those of [federal law], then collateral estoppel, in
the absence of countervailing statutory policy, would bar relitigation of
those issues in the [federal] court."'
22
The res judicata problem both exacerbates and illuminates the un-
derlying dissonance between judicial abstention and the legislative pre-
rogative to establish exclusive federal jurisdiction. A provocative
problem of separation of powers, this conflict assumes even greater pro-
portions in actual litigation.
3. Key v. Wise: The Antithesis Surfaces
The Fifth Circuit recently decided Ke, v. Wise,' 23 which involved
elements of abstention, exclusive federal jurisdiction, and res judicata.
In that case, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Wises and the
United States in federal district court for an adjudication of their rights
in a certain tract of land in Mississippi. The plaintiffs originally predi-
cated jurisdiction on diversity, but Congress subsequently enacted a
statute conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts in such ac-
tions.' 24 The district court noted that it had jurisdiction of the action
and then proceeded to remit 25 the parties to state court for resolution of
the controversy on the ground that the case involved unsettled and com-
120 See, e.g., Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S. 388 (1929); Calvert Fire Ins.
Co. v. American Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1236 n.18 (7th Cir. 1979); Vernitron
Corp. v. Benjamin, 440 F.2d 105, 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971) ("The subse-
quent effect of collateral estoppel. . . should be welcomed to avoid the task of reconsidering
issues which have already been settled by another competent tribunal."); Granader v. Public
Bank, 417 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1065 (1970).
121 442 U.S. 127 (1979). Felsen, the debtor, had previously settled a collection suit
brought against him in state court by a bank. The state court also rendered judgment against
Felsen in favor of Brown, the guarantor of the bank loan that was the subject of the collection
suit; the state court did not, however, indicate the basis for its decision. Id. at 128. Subse-
quently, Felsen filed a petition in bankruptcy and sought to have his debt to Brown dis-
charged. Brown argued that the debt was not dischargeable because the guarantee had been
the product of fraud, deceit, and malicious conversion on Felsen's part. Id. at 129. Felsen
argued that res judicata barred "relitigation" of the nature of his debt to Brown. Id.
122 Id. at 139 n.10.
123 629 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 682 (1981) (Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
124 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(0 (1976), which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions. . . to quiet title to an estate or interest in real
property in which an interest is claimed by the United States." The United States had an
interest in the property because it had acquired perpetual easements from the Wises for the
purpose of constructing a levee across the property. 629 F.2d at 1052.
125 See note 7 supra (discussion of remittal).
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plex issues of state law.' 26 The district court retained jurisdiction pend-
ing the outcome of the yet to be filed state suit. The plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration of the remittal was denied, and an appeal to the
Fifth Circuit was dismissed without opinion.
127
The Wises, defendants in the federal action, proceeded to file an
action in state court in accordance with the district court's remittal.
The Keys, now state court defendants, did not assert an affirmative
cross-bill against the Wises and the United States because they feared
such action would operate as a waiver of their right to return to the
federal forum. 128 The state court, concluding that the case was not one
of exclusive federal jurisdiction because the federal jurisdictional statute
was inapplicable to the state proceedings, awarded title to the Wises.129
The Keys appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court and also peti-
tioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus vacating the district
court's remittal. 130 The Fifth Circuit refused to issue the writ, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision.' 3' Subsequently, the Mississippi Supreme Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision against the Keys, 132 concluding that
the state court had properly assumed jurisdiction of the case, and denied
the Keys' request for a rehearing. Thereafter, the parties returned to the
federal district court. Having retained jurisdiction pending the outcome
of the state action, the district court proceeded to dismiss the Keys' ex-
clusively federal action, giving the state action res judicata effect.'
33
The Keys then appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit characterized the appeal as a collateral attack on
the state court judgment 13 4 and affirmed the decision of the district
court. The court concluded that "[a]bstention in this case was clearly
improper"; 3 5 however, in view of the unsettled question of a district
court's "power"' 136 to abstain in the face of exclusive federal jurisdiction,
the court was hesitant to rule that the mere impropriety of federal ab-
stention affected the state court's jurisdiction. In addition, the court ex-
126 See 629 F.2d at 1053.
127 See id.
128 Id. at 1058. See genera4.y England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964).
129 The state court concluded that there was no issue of exclusive federal jurisdiction
because the United States was not involved in the state action. See 629 F.2d at 1057. See also
Key v. Wise, 341 So. 2d 1326, 1327 (Miss. 1977).
130 See 629 F.2d at 1054.
131 429 U.S. 1023 (1976).
132 Key v. Wise, 341 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1977).
133 629 F.2d at 1054.
134 Id. at 1058.
135 Id. at 1059.
136 Id. at 1060 (emphasis in original).
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plained that the preclusive effect of state court decisions relating to
exclusively federal issues is unclear. Noting that the parties had openly
litigated the jurisdictional question in state court, and that the law to be
applied to the controversy was entirely local (notwithstanding exclusive
federal jurisdiction), the Fifth Circuit, Judge Brown dissenting, held
that the state court judgment was final.
Thus, the plaintiffs, properly having filed an exclusively federal
claim in federal court, were shuttled from court to court over a period of
five years without ever having their affirmative claim to the land adjudi-
cated in any court. The decision demonstrates the sober reality of the
unresolved conflict between judicial abstention and legislative mandates
of exclusive jurisdiction. 137 Key v. Wize is thus a glaring example of the
need for judicial recognition of abstention's expansion and definitive




An effective solution to the separation of powers conflict between
judicial abstention and congressionally mandated exclusive jurisdiction
lies both in the ability of the judiciary to regulate its own procedures
and in the heretofore dormant legislative power to formulate statutory
guidelines for judicial activity in this area. Although the legislative pro-
posals suggested below effectively would alleviate the complexities ofju-
dicial abstention in the context of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the
judiciary too can act to retain responsibility for the formulation of oper-
ative guidelines.
The courts, which created abstention, should seek to regulate it as
well. First, they must acknowledge the expansion of abstention and the
theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine as it is exercised today.138
Courts should no longer purport to limit the practice to the conven-
tional prototypes when, in fact, the breadth of judicial abstention ex-
tends beyond them. Similarly, courts should recognize that abstention
can be justified legitimately by considerations of pragmatism as well as
federalism-concern for federal/state relations is a valid but not exclu-
sive basis for judicial abstention. These theoretical underpinnings,
137 The Fifth Circuit could have rectified the district court's abuse of authority by char-
acterizing the appeal not as a collateral attack on the state court judgment for want ofjurisdic-
tion but as a direct attack on the federal court's decision to abstain. The essential point,
however, is that similar decisions will continue to cause irreparable harm to innocent litigants
unless clear guidelines for the exercise of abstention are set forth.
138 See generaly notes 7-10 and accompanying text supra.
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rather than the presence or absence of categorical fact patterns, should
be the primary considerations in exercising abstention.
In formulating operative guidelines, the federal courts first should
conclude that they are without authority to remit 39 or dismiss' 4° any
claim within their exclusive jurisdiction when there is no pending state
action. 141 Abstention is unjustifiable under such circumstances. The
pragmatic considerations that could support abstention are absent.
There is no danger of duplicative proceedings, wasted judicial resources,
or res judicata, because only one judicial proceeding exists. In fact, the
pragmatic considerations that do arise favor a denial of abstention. Be-
cause jurisdiction is exclusively federal, the federal forum is the one that
is most likely to make a comprehensive disposition of the action. More-
over, the initiation of such an action in state court would involve unnec-
essary expenditures, promote rather than avoid duplication of judicial
effort, and create rather than prevent the problem of res judicata. 142 In
addition, remittal or dismissal in the absence of a pending state proceed-
ing generally would fail to promote federal/state relations. It is difficult
to demonstrate an overriding state interest in an action that Congress
has determined should be heard only in federal court. Although ele-
ments of federalism or comity might arise in isolated instances, they are
offset by the legislative policies granting exclusive jurisdiction to the fed-
eral courts.
Judicial guidelines for exercising abstention when parallel proceed-
ings are pending in the state forum should be considered in conjunction
with the following legislative proposal, which modifies the present re-
moval statute' 43 to provide for removal in cases of exclusive federal
jurisdiction:
A civil action brought in a state court may be removed to the district
court of the United States embracing the place where such action is
pending, by the state court sua sponte or by any defendant or plaintiff
by or against whom a substantial claim or defense arising under a
statute granting exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts is properly
139 See note 7 supra (discussion of remittal).
140 See id. (discussion of dismissal).
141 Judicial recognition of the absence of such power would prevent the possibility of
another K9, v. Wise; courts would be unable to direct a federal plaintiff with an exclusively
federal claim to the state system for a de now disposition.
142 If the court gives preclusive effect to state court judgments, then the remittal or dis-
missal would not result in duplication ofjudicial effort where there is no pending state action.
Giving such preclusive effect, however, would undermine Congress's intent to confer exclusive
jurisdiction in the area. See notes 115-22 and accompanying text supra.
143 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). Under current law, an exclusively federal action com-
menced in state court cannot be removed to federal court, because the state court lacks juris-




asserted, if such removal is invoked within thirty days of service of the
pleading under which such claim or defense arises. 144
This removal proposal ensures the preeminence of the federal fo-
rum in actions involving matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal system. Any party who deserves and desires the federal forum is
accommodated. In addition, the state court may "remove" the action to
federal court-in essence, the state court can exercise remittal when an
exclusively federal claim is presented-when the parties might otherwise
be attracted to the lingering opportunity of another "bite of the apple"
in the federal court. Once removal is invoked, the federal court can
exercise its exclusive jurisdiction over the federal claim and adjudicate
the entire controversy.
45
In the absence of the modified removal provision, federal courts
would be forced to "balance" competing interests when confronted with
a request for abstention in the context of an exclusively federal matter.
In each situation, the court would have to consider, inter alia, the reasons
behind the particular grant of exclusive jurisdiction, the implications of
"implied" rather than explicit exclusive jurisdiction, the nature of the
controversy, 46 and the interests of the state courts in adjudicating par-
ticular issues within their domain. The removal proposal reduces the
need for such "balancing" tests, however, by generally ensuring federal
adjudication of exclusively federal matters when appropriate.
Under this proposal, a federal district court will be able to abstain
in the context of exclusive jurisdiction and pending state proceedings
only if removal has been circumvented or delayed. In such cases, the
district court should consider carefully the facts and determine if the
plaintiff is employing procedural tactics to avail himself of alternative
dispositions of the same claim. If a party really wants his rights adjudi-
144 The suggested extension of § 1441 to actions involving exclusive jurisdiction is based
in part on the ALI's recommendation for removal in general federal question cases. See ALI
STUDY, supra note 4, at 25-27 (§ 1312). See also Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law
Institute Part 11, 36 U. CHI. L. R-v. 268, 275-76 (1969); Note, supra note 50, 91 HARV. L. REV.
at 1305-07. Professor Currie supports the ALI version but would allow either party to remove
at any stage of the pleadings and would extend the provision to allow removal when any
federal counterclaim is made. Currie, supra, at 275.
145 The federal court would have pendent jurisdiction over the related state claims. See
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). At first glance, the removal proposal
might appear further to overburden the federal docket with actions that are otherwise amena-
ble to state court adjudication. Further scrutiny, however, reveals that the proposal only
effectuates the legislative prerogative to allocate federal jurisdiction. The removal proposal
ensures that a federal court will hear an exclusivelyfederal claim or defense. Furthermore, the
requirement that such claim or defense be "substantial" should prevent any party from ad-
vancing a frivolous federal claim in order to have his more substantial state claim or defense
adjudicated in federal court.
146 For example, in K9 v. Wise, the merits of the initial federal action involved purely




cated in federal court, presumably he will remove when given the op-
portunity. Admittedly, the legislative policy judgment concerning
exclusive federal jurisdiction is still present under these circumstances.
Considerations of judicial pragmatism, however, as well as considera-
tions that relate to the integrity of the judicial system and legislative
allocation of jurisdiction within this system by virtue of the removal pro-
vision, offset this policy judgment. Neither Congress nor the courts
should encourage procedural artifice by reserving a back-up forum for
the most clever litigant.
B. A Legislative Framework
In the absence of or in conjunction with prompt judicial reform,
Congress can preserve its own policy judgments by expanding the cur-
rent removal provision, as noted above, and by legislating a few rela-
tively simple conditions for the exercise of judicial abstention.1 47 This
Note suggests the following statutory framework as a model for legisla-
tive consideration. Section One would apply in the absence of pending
state proceedings. Sections Two and Three would govern the exercise of
judicial abstention when an exclusively federal matter is raised in a state
proceeding. TAken together, these statutory proposals parallel the
guidelines suggested for judicial self-regulation.
§ Z No Pending State Action
The district courts of the United States are without authority to remit
or dismiss a claim the jurisdiction of which is by statute exclusive
when there is no litigation on the claim concurrently pending in the
state courts.
§ 2. Removal
A civil action brought in a state court may be removed to the district
court of the United States embracing the place where such action is
pending, by the state court sua sponte or by any defendant or plaintiff
by or against whom a substantial claim or defense arising under a
statute granting exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts is properly
asserted, if such removal is invoked within thirty days of service of the
pleading under which such claim or defense arises.
§ 3. Pending State Action
A district court of the United States presented with a claim arising
under a statute granting exclusive jurisdiction to the district courts
may, if an action adjudicating the claim or matters closely related
thereto is concurrently pending in state court, request removal under
147 For general criticism of Congress's performance in allocating jurisdiction to the fed-




[§ 2]. If the state court and the parties fail to remove the action in
accordance with the district court's request, or the district court does
not request removal, the district court may, in its discretion, stay fed-
eral proceedings pending final determination of the state dispute, or
proceed to adjudicate the federal action.
Under this statutory model, the decision to remit or dismiss in the con-
text of exclusive jurisdiction is not left to the judge's discretion when no
state action is pending. Section One clearly deprives a federal court of
,power to employ these procedural devices in the face of exclusive juris-
diction. 14 8 At the same time, judicial abstention under the conventional
prototypes is unaffected because, by definition, the conventional proto-
types do not involve areas of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Sections Two and Three virtually eliminate the problem of judicial
abstention in exclusively federal cases even when there is a pending state
claim. As discussed above, 14 9 Section Two, the removal provision, en-
sures the preeminence of the federal forum. Consequently, federal
courts will invoke Section Three rarely. If an action should be adjudi-
cated in the federal forum, it should reach the district court by removal.
If a party who desires the federal forum delays for more than thirty days
or otherwise fails to remove the state action under Section Two and then
files a separate claim in federal district court, Section Three applies. If
the district court does not exercise its option to request removal or if the
state court and parties do not comply with the district court's request,
then. it may consider abstention. Here, as under the judicially regulated
scheme,1 50 the court should balance the policies underlying exclusive ju-
risdiction against the judicial interest in discouraging procedural ma-
neuvering and promoting judicial economy.
15 '
CONCLUSION
Judicial abstention is an important and effective device when used
properly. Although the presence of exclusive jurisdiction elucidates the
need for well-defined standards in this area, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to provide guidelines without legislative authorization.
The federal courts should openly acknowledge their use of abstention in
terms of the theoretical underpinnings--either federalism or pragma-
tism or both-that justify abstention in any particular case. This will
facilitate the judiciary's task of redefining the parameters of abstention
148 Any unauthorized decision to remit or dismiss the parties would be reviewable imme-
diately by writ of mandamus. Although the availability of mandamus is severely limited, the
writ is obtainable when a judge exceeds his statutorily defined power. Ste Thermtron Prods.,
Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 351 (1976).
149 Set notes 144-46 and accompanying text sufpra.
150 See notes 138-45 and accompanying text supira.
151 See notes 145-47 and accompanying text sufra.
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in the form of operative guidelines for its exercise. Congress should also
act to preserve its sovereignty in the realm of jurisdictional allocation by
liberalizing the removal provision and by forbidding abstention in all
cases involving exclusive federal jurisdiction in the absence of concur-
rent state proceedings.
Shaql Walker
